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Abstract
Present-biased preferences cause distortions in consumption that can motivate
the use of paternalistic in-kind transfers. Empirically, goods are consumed to dif-
ferent degrees when consumption outlay changes. Economists distinguish between
necessary goods and luxury goods. A present-biased individual has an intertem-
poral distortion of consumption toward the present, which in turn distorts present
consumption toward luxury goods. In-kind transfers of necessary goods, such as
food stamps, can alleviate the intertemporal distortion and make present-biased
transfer recipients better oﬀ. Further, transfers in kind are asymmetrical in the
sense that they can target present-biased recipients without aﬀecting fully rational
recipients.
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1 Introduction
Most means-tested government transfers in the United States are provided in kind, for
example as food stamps, Medicaid, and housing aid. In 2002, cash aid was only 20
percent of total expenditure on state and federal means-tested welfare programs (Burke,
2003). Economists are typically skeptical of transfers in kind since they may violate the
principle of consumer sovereignty. No rational transfer recipient would prefer a transfer
in kind to a cash transfer of equivalent value. If income maintenance programs are to help
recipients in the best possible way, it is tempting to conclude that the transfers should
be provided in cash and not tied to consumption of certain goods.
A commonly held notion among practitioners of public policy is that the use of in-kind
transfers reflects paternalism. If the government has preferences directly on the recipi-
ents’ consumption patterns, then transfers in kind can be used to ensure consumption of
goods that the government for some reason finds desirable. Following Musgrave (1959),
the literature on public economics calls such goods merit goods. This view leaves little
guidance for policy design. First, we need a theory that motivates why the government
has preferences directly on consumption. Second, we need a framework allowing us to
distinguish between good paternalistic policies and bad paternalistic policies, where re-
cipients would be better oﬀ deciding for themselves. Third, we need a framework helping
us to design paternalistic policies. The existing literature gives little help with these
issues.
The growing literature on behavioral economics systematically examines deviations
from rational economic behavior. By using psychological insights, as well as controlled
experiments, this literature has pointed out several common and persistent behavior rules
that conflict with economists’ understanding of rationality.1 For instance, there is ample
evidence that people are impulsive and tend to desire immediate rewards, even if this is
contrary to their long run interests.2 In an interesting new paper, Shapiro (2005) provides
1See Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) for a survey of the literature.
2Thaler and Loewenstein (1992) provide an overview of some of the empirical evidence.
1
evidence that such behavior is prevalent on a daily basis among U.S. benefit recipients.
Economists have modeled impulsive behavior by present-biased preferences, where
the relative discount rate between two time periods increases the closer they are to the
present.3 An individual with present-biased preferences is said to have a self-control prob-
lem since there is a conflict between the individual’s present preferences and the prefer-
ences that the individual will have in the future. The present-bias leads to distortions
in the intertemporal allocation of consumption; particularly, a present-biased individual
would be better oﬀ if she could commit herself to save more for later consumption. These
distortions imply that there can be scope for government intervention.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how present-biased preferences can
motivate the use of transfers in kind, such as food stamps, for paternalistic reasons and to
provide a framework for the design of such policies. The key argument is that, empirically,
goods are consumed to diﬀerent degrees when income or consumption outlay changes.
Economists distinguish between necessary goods and luxury goods. For example, necessary
goods, such as food, are consumed relatively less when outlay is high. One implication
of this is that intertemporal distortions in consumption also result in a change in the
relative consumption shares of goods. Present-biased preferences cause an intertemporal
distortion toward the present which in turn distorts present consumption toward luxury
goods. This motivates why in-kind transfers of necessary goods can help present-biased
transfer recipients. When the recipients are forced to consume more necessary goods,
they are in eﬀect also forced to postpone consumption.
This kind of regulation is paternalistic in the sense that it overrides the recipients’
own decisions. Still, a benevolent government would want to engage in such policies if
they could benefit the recipients in the longer run by helping to correct the self-control
problem. If present-biased recipients are sophisticated, meaning that they are aware of
their future self-control problems, they will in fact prefer to receive future benefits partly
3Such preferences are also called time-inconsistent preferences. Classic references are Strotz (1956)
and Phelps and Pollak (1968).
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in kind since this can help to restrain their future behavior. The advantage of in-kind
transfers over traditional corrective instruments, such as a luxury tax, is that they are
likely to target exactly those recipients who suﬀer from the self-control problem without
interfering with the choices of perfectly rational recipients. This constitutes an example
of asymmetric paternalism, as defined by Camerer et al. (2003).
Recent studies on present-biased preferences, with specific relation to this paper, in-
clude Shapiro (2005) who provides empirical evidence in favor of impulsiveness among
benefit recipients. Using data on the daily caloric intake of U.S. food stamp recipients,
he finds that food consumption declines over the food stamp month. This decline is too
sharp to be explained by reasonable exponential time discount rates but supports that
recipients have present-biased preferences. Other papers have used the theory of present-
biased preferences for recommendations on tax policy. Gruber and Köszegi (2001, 2004)
use present-biased preferences to model cigarette consumption in order to analyze the
implications for optimal excise taxes on cigarettes. In a somewhat similar approach,
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) study optimal taxation in a model where present-biased
individuals consume an ineﬃciently large amount of a good involving negative health con-
sequences in the long run. One common feature of these papers is that the government
should use paternalistic Pigouvian taxes on unhealthy goods to correct for negative “in-
ternalities” caused by self-control problems. Recently, Bertrand et al. (2004) have argued
that behavioral insights may be of particular importance for poverty-alleviating policies.
The present paper should be viewed as a first step toward modeling the optimal design
of income maintenance programs when behavioral issues are important.
Another strand of literature related to this paper has sought to justify the use of
in-kind transfers within the rational choice framework. One result is that cash trans-
fers can encourage recipients to behave ineﬃciently in order to manipulate the size of
future transfers, see Bruce and Waldman (1991). For example, a transfer recipient may
deliberately choose to save too little or to underinvest in education in order to induce
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a larger future transfer from a benevolent government (the Samaritan’s Dilemma). The
government can possibly avoid this ineﬃciency by providing transfers in kind, e.g., by
tying part of the transfer to education or other illiquid assets. In fact, the case for in-kind
transfers of necessary goods that is presented in this paper also extends to their model.
If the recipient chooses to save too little for strategic reasons, then the government can
force the recipient to save more by tying part of the initial transfer to necessary goods.
A second insight in this literature is that transfers in kind can be used to screen re-
cipients in second-best environments of incomplete information, see for instance Nichols
and Zeckhauser (1982) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1988). Small distortions of the
benefit recipients’ consumption can increase transfer eﬃciency because the self-selection
constraints of the transfer program are eased. The ideas presented in the present paper
add a new dimension to this line of reasoning. As will be explained below, present-biased
preferences may influence self-selection into transfer programs but the eﬀect depends
crucially on whether the recipients are sophisticated or not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two-period model that
explains the main argument while Section 3 analyzes an N-period model that includes
the strategic eﬀects of self-control. Section 4 considers how paternalistic transfers in kind
aﬀect the possibilities for income redistribution. Section 5 concludes.
2 In-Kind Transfers of Necessary Goods
The main focus of the paper is on how transfer recipients allocate consumption in the
short run. The analysis rests on two basic premises. The first premise is that recipients
are unable to borrow against future income and hence are constrained by their current
disposable income. If government benefits are their only source of income and they
discount future utility, their planning horizon will be the time between transfers and,
consistent with the empirical findings, their consumption will be declining over the trans-
fer period. The second premise is that some, or all, of the intended transfer recipients
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have present-biased preferences. If we think of recipients who receive a cash allowance at
the beginning of each month, the present-bias implies that they will go on a consumption
binge and spend too much money during the first couple of weeks such that there is little
money left at the end of the month.
The government can help the present-biased recipients by forcing them to smooth
consumption. If cash benefits were smaller but paid out more frequently, for example
biweekly instead of monthly, the recipients would have less opportunity to overconsume (a
possibility mentioned by, e.g., Shapiro, 2005). However, there is a limit to the frequency
of transfer payments. At some point transaction costs will outweigh the advantages from
curbing the self-control problem. Eventually, recipients are left to decide on their own
how to allocate consumption until the next transfer payment.
Because diﬀerent goods are related in diﬀerent ways to consumption outlay, the gov-
ernment can help the present-biased recipients in an alternative way. In particular, the
intertemporal distortions of outlay distort consumption toward luxury goods at the be-
ginning of the planning horizon and toward necessary goods at the end. For the sake
of argument, assume that a recipient can spend money on two goods: a luxury good
and a necessary good, for instance food. The government can help recipients to restrain
consumption at the beginning of the month by providing part of the transfer as vouchers
for food (food stamps). For this to work, the value of the food stamps would have to
exceed the value of the recipient’s food consumption before the intervention, such that
the vouchers force the individual to consume more food. Since food consumption is dis-
torted toward the end of the planning horizon because of the present-bias, the marginal
propensity to consume the additional units of food is higher at the end. By substituting
cash for food stamps and keeping the value of the allowance constant, the government in
eﬀect forces the recipient to postpone consumption.
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2.1 A Two-Period Model
In order to demonstrate how in-kind transfers of a necessary good can aﬀect the intertem-
poral allocation of consumption, we first consider a single transfer recipient in a model
where transfers are awarded every other period. This simple model disregards the strate-
gic eﬀects of self-control. A model with N periods that captures these strategic aspects
is presented in Section 3. For simplicity we assume that there are only two goods: food,
F , and taxis, T . The recipient has the intertemporal utility function
U = u (F1, T1) + βδu (F2, T2) ,
where 0 < β ≤ 1 and 0 < δ < 1. At this point, we can think of βδ as a normal time
discount factor, but later on (from Section 2.2 onwards) we will interpret β as representing
the present-bias, whereas δ will represent the standard time-consistent discount factor.
The instantaneous utility function u (F, T ) is strictly increasing in each argument, twice
diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave. Both F and T are normal goods and the marginal
utility of either good is infinitely large when consumption is zero.
For now, we assume that the recipient receives a cash transfer payment B in period
1 (we consider a simple model of income redistribution in Section 4). It is possible to
transfer income from period 1 to period 2 by saving, but it is assumed that savings do not
accrue interest. This is an unrealistic assumption but it can be motivated by our focus
on a short planning horizon, where the interest rate presumably has a negligible influence
on intertemporal decisions. Importantly, there is corroborating empirical evidence that
many benefit recipients in the U.S. do not hold interest bearing assets. In the 2002 sample
from the Survey of Program Dynamics by the U.S. Census Bureau, only 14 percent of
households receiving food stamps report that they own an interest bearing account.4 The
assumption may not be innocuous, however. This will be discussed in Section 5.
The recipient maximizes intertemporal utility subject to the budget constraint B ≥
4Additionally, in the March 2004 supplement to the Current Population Survey by the U.S. Census
Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 14 percent of households receiving food stamps have positive
gross interest income. The median level of annual interest income among those households is $28.
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pF (F1 + F2)+ pT (T1 + T2), where pF and pT are the prices of F and T , respectively. We
call the solution to this program [(F ∗1 , T
∗
1 ) , (F
∗
2 , T
∗
2 )]. From the first order conditions we
can obtain the following necessary conditions
uF (F ∗t , T
∗
t )
uT (F ∗t , T
∗
t )
=
pF
pT
, t = 1, 2, (1)
uF (F ∗2 , T
∗
2 )
uF (F ∗1 , T
∗
1 )
=
uT (F ∗2 , T
∗
2 )
uT (F ∗1 , T
∗
1 )
=
1
βδ
, (2)
where a subscript on u (F, T ) denotes the partial derivative. In the optimum the recipient
sets the marginal rate of substitution in each period equal to the price ratio. Consumption
of both F and T is higher in period 1 than in period 2. The relative size of consumption
outlay in period 1 increases when βδ decreases, since period 2 is discounted more.
Now assume that part of the cash transfer B is replaced with vouchers for F , which
we can think of as food stamps. The vouchers have value V and can only be used to
purchase F . We assume that the vouchers cannot be exchanged for money. However, the
recipient can freely decide how to divide the vouchers between F1 and F2 and she can
purchase additional units of F in the market if she wishes to do so. The residual part of
the transfer is available as money income M , such that M + V = B.
The recipient will spend all vouchers since the marginal utility of F is strictly positive.
Hence, the recipient faces a voucher constraint, V ≤ pF (F1 + F2) in addition to the
cash budget constraint, which we can rewrite as M ≥ pF (F1 + F2) + pT (T1 + T2) − V .
When intertemporal utility is maximized subject to the two constraints, condition (2)
still applies but the first order conditions yield a new expression for the intratemporal
allocation
uF (Ft, Tt)
uT (Ft, Tt)
=
µ
λ− γ
λ
¶
pF
pT
, t = 1, 2. (3)
The parameters λ > 0 and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers of, respectively, the money
budget constraint and the voucher constraint. We have γ = 0 if and only if the voucher
constraint is not binding. In this case, the recipient chooses [(F ∗1 , T
∗
1 ) , (F
∗
2 , T
∗
2 )] and is
said to be inframarginal. The voucher constraint will be binding, such that the recipient
is rationed, if the value of the vouchers exceeds the inframarginal outlay on F ; that is, if
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V > pF (F ∗1 + F
∗
2 ). Rationing distorts the intratemporal tradeoﬀ between goods since a
rationed recipient is, in eﬀect, forced to substitute toward F .
The intratemporal distortion created by rationing will aﬀect the intertemporal alloca-
tion if the propensities to consume each good diﬀer across periods. To see this, suppose
that the recipient is rationed and conduct the following policy experiment: raise the
value of the vouchers marginally and reduce the cash transfer such that we still have
M + V = B. This forces the recipient to consume strictly more F and strictly less T .
If the marginal propensity to consume F is relatively high in period 2, this change will
shift consumption outlay toward period 2.
Lemma 1. For a rationed recipient, a marginal increase in the value of the vouchers,
dV > 0, and a decrease in the cash transfer, dM , such that dM = −dV , will reduce
consumption outlay in period 1, B1 = pFF1 + pTT1, if and only if
pTuFF (F1, T1)− pFuTF (F1, T1)
pFuTT (F1, T1)− pTuTF (F1, T1)
(4)
>
pTuFF (F2, T2)− pFuTF (F2, T2)
pFuTT (F2, T2)− pTuTF (F2, T2)
.
Proof. See appendix B.
The condition (4) has an intuitive interpretation when the recipient is only marginally
rationed. First, diﬀerentiate the intratemporal first order condition (1) for an inframar-
ginal recipient. This gives an expression for the slope of the income expansion path in
(F, T ) space
dTt
dFt
=
pTuFF (Ft, Tt)− pFuTF (Ft, Tt)
pFuTT (Ft, Tt)− pTuTF (Ft, Tt)
.
The slope of the income expansion path expresses the relative changes in F and T that are
necessary in order to fulfill the intratemporal first order condition when outlay changes.
The numerator and the denominator are both negative when F and T are normal, such
that the income expansion path has a positive slope. Now suppose that the transfer
bundle consists of a cash part, M∗ = pT (T ∗1 + T
∗
2 ), and vouchers for F with value V
∗ =
8
FT
(F* , T*)1 1
(F* ,T*)2 2
Figure 1: Income Expansion Path
pF (F ∗1 + F
∗
2 ). The voucher constraint is fulfilled with equality but the recipient chooses
the inframarginal allocation [(F ∗1 , T
∗
1 ) , (F
∗
2 , T
∗
2 )]. If the value of the vouchers increases by
dV > 0 and the cash transfer changes by dM = −dV , the recipient becomes marginally
rationed and Lemma 1 tells us that period 1 outlay is reduced if and only if 5
dT ∗1
dF ∗1
>
dT ∗2
dF ∗2
.
This is equivalent to saying that the slope of the income expansion path is greater in
period 1 than in period 2, when evaluated in the inframarginal optimum. The condition
is fulfilled if the income expansion path bends toward T as outlay increases since con-
sumption outlay is greater in period 1 (see Figure 1). With an income expansion path
that slopes toward T , the relative consumption of T is high when outlay is high. In this
sense, we say that T is a luxury good and F is a necessary good.
The usual definition of luxury goods and necessary goods does not use the income
expansion path. Rather, the common definition is that the budget share of a luxury good
is increasing in outlay (an income elasticity larger than one) whereas the budget share of
a necessary good is decreasing in outlay (an income elasticity less than one). It is fairly
5Strictly speaking, the method used for deriving Lemma 1 cannot be guaranteed to be valid in
[(F ∗1 , T
∗
1 ) , (F
∗
2 , T
∗
2 )], because this allocation is exactly on the boundary between two sets of constraints.
This is a well-established concern in the literature on rationing and the reader is referred to Tobin and
Houthakker (1951) and Pollak (1969) for discussions of the issue.
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easy to relate this to the slope of the income expansion path. In any period outlay equals
the value of consumption. If we diﬀerentiate this totally we find that the budget share
of T is increasing in outlay if and only if dTt/dFt > Tt/Ft. Hence, T is a luxury good
according to the usual definition if and only if the slope of the income expansion path
exceeds the slope of the secant line from the origin to (F, T ). If the income expansion
path T = f (F ) is strictly convex and passes through the origin (as in Figure 1), then T is
a luxury good in the usual sense for all outlay levels. The two definitions are not identical,
however. It is possible to find examples where the slope of the income expansion path is
increasing in outlay even though the budget share of T is decreasing and vice versa.
2.2 Welfare
The principle of consumer sovereignty tells us that a rational transfer recipient never
prefers an in-kind transfer to a cash transfer of equivalent value. Hence, transfers should
not be tied to goods if the government wishes to help a rational recipient in the best
possible way. In the presence of self-control problems, however, it may be desirable to
provide the transfers partly in kind in order to restrict the recipient’s choice set. A
recipient with present-biased preferences has an impulsive urge to spend much of the
transfer upon receipt. The recipient disapproves of this urge in the longer run and would
prefer to smooth consumption over the planning horizon. The government can help to
achieve this by tying part of the transfer to the necessary good.
We take β to represent the self-control problem. A fully rational, time-consistent
recipient has β = 1 and only discounts period 2 consumption with δ. In contrast, a
present-biased recipient has β < 1 in period 1 and therefore has an additional fondness
for present consumption. A present-biased recipient chooses to allocate more income to
consumption in period 1 than a rational recipient with the same income would choose,
since period 2 is discounted more. This framework is a crude example of the quasi-
hyperbolic model, which was originally proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and has
been reintroduced to the literature by Laibson (1997). The two-period model in this
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section can be obtained as a special case of the quasi-hyperbolic model, where transfer
recipients are credit constrained and transfers are awarded every other period.
There is no unambiguous way of evaluating welfare when the recipient has a self-
control problem, since preferences diﬀer over time. Throughout this paper, we assume
that the recipient’s welfare can be expressed by setting β = 1 in the intertemporal utility
function. These are the preferences that the recipient would use if she were to evaluate
consumption in period 1 and 2 at any point in time before entering period 1. They
capture the fact that there is no special preference for period 1 consumption in itself in
the longer run and that the recipient disapproves of the impulsive period 1 behavior at
all other times. This welfare measure is called long-run utility and has been used by
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2003) and Gruber and Köszegi (2001, 2004) in order to
make normative statements about paternalistic policies.
A marginal amount of rationing with respect to the necessary good F can increase
the long-run utility of a present-biased recipient. Let
£¡
FP1 , T
P
1
¢
,
¡
FP2 , T
P
2
¢¤
denote the
allocation chosen by an inframarginal present-biased recipient who receives a transfer of
value B.
Proposition 1. Starting from V = pF
¡
FP1 + F
P
2
¢
, a marginal increase in the value of
the vouchers, dV > 0, and a decrease in the cash transfer, dM , such that dM = −dV ,
will increase the long-run utility of a present-biased recipient if and only if dTP1 /dF
P
1 >
dTP2 /dF
P
2 .
Proof. See appendix B.
The intuition behind the result is that the long-run utility welfare measure treats the
present-bias as a decision error. A small amount of rationing causes a small intratemporal
distortion which is dominated by the first order welfare gain from a reduction of the
intertemporal distortion. It is worth mentioning that this result does not hinge on the
specific assumption of long-run utility as the true welfare metric. The crucial assumption
is that the recipient will be better oﬀ by smoothing consumption.
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2.3 Asymmetric Paternalism
Having considered the case of a single transfer recipient, we now turn to the issue of a
heterogeneous population of recipients. While transfers in kind can benefit present-biased
recipients by helping them to curb their self-control problems, the government should be
wary of interfering with the choices of fully rational recipients who are better oﬀ deciding
for themselves.
Vouchers for F only aﬀect the choices of recipients who are rationed. This makes it
possible to target present-biased recipients if they on average demand less F than rational
recipients, even if the government is unable to distinguish one type from the other. There
is a restriction on the income expansion path, closely connected to increasing slope, which
ensures this. Let
¡
FR1 , F
R
2
¢
and
¡
FP1 , F
P
2
¢
be the demands for F by, respectively, a rational
recipient with β = 1 and a present-biased recipient with β < 1, when both recipients are
inframarginal and receive identical transfer bundles.
Lemma 2. If the income expansion path T = f (F ) is convex on the interval
£
FP2 , F
P
1
¤
,
then FR1 +F
R
2 ≥ FP1 +FP2 . The inequality is strict if the income expansion path is strictly
convex.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 2. If the income expansion path T = f (F ) is strictly convex on the
interval
£
FP2 , F
P
1
¤
, there exists a range of values of V that will increase the long-run
utility of a present-biased recipient while leaving a rational recipient inframarginal.
Proof. See appendix B.
In other words, if the income expansion path is “well-behaved,” a present-biased recipient
demands less of the necessary good than a rational recipient does, such that it is possible
to help present-biased recipients without aﬀecting the choices of rational ones.
The possibility of targeting exactly those recipients who suﬀer from the self-control
problem is a very attractive feature. Economists are normally cautious of policies that
interfere with people’s choices. On the other hand, individuals who make poor decisions
12
may benefit immensely from a guiding hand. Considerations such as these have led some
economists to argue that a yardstick by which to measure benign paternalistic policies
is that they help people who make decision errors, while imposing very small costs on
people who can decide for themselves. Camerer et al. (2003) use the term “asymmetric
paternalism” to describe such policies. Within this mindset, a policy of in-kind transfers
of the necessary good is an example of desirable paternalism, in the sense that it can leave
rational recipients unaﬀected. A tax on the luxury good would distort intratemporal
preferences for all individuals in the economy, not only for the intended target group,
and hence may not be desirable.6
3 An N-Period Model
The consumption choices made at any point in time will influence the choice set in
future periods through the level and composition of savings. A recipient takes this into
account when maximizing intertemporal utility, since the recipient has preferences on
future consumption. The simple two-period model from the previous section paid no
heed to the fact that recipients may be well aware of their future self control problems.
If a recipient knows that she will be present-biased in the future, such that there is
a conflict between present and future preferences, she may use savings strategically to
manipulate her choices in the future. This section develops an N-period model that
allows for strategic behavior and considers how in-kind transfers aﬀect the recipients’
choices.
Following the literature, the consumption decision is modeled as a non-cooperative
game between the diﬀerent incarnations of the recipient at diﬀerent points in time. We
assume that a present-biased recipient has quasi-hyperbolic preferences and we let “self
t” denote the decision maker in period t.
6However, as demonstrated by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), a marginal excise tax on a “sinful”
good will only have adverse utility eﬀects of second-order for fully rational individuals while possibly
having positive first-order eﬀects for individuals with self-control problems.
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FT
(F* , T*)1 1
(F* , T*)2 2
Figure 2: Quasi-Linear Preferences
The equilibrium strategies of a recipient’s selves are required to be subgame perfect.
These strategies have the property that the choice made by any self is required to be an
optimal response to the choices made by all subsequent selves. It is often a formidable
task to characterize these strategies since the maximization problem is quite complex.7
In order to simplify, we restrict recipients to have quasi-linear preferences on consump-
tion, such that instantaneous utility is T + u (F ), where u (F ) is an increasing, twice
diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave function. It is assumed that limF→0 uF (F ) =∞ and
limF→∞ uF (F ) = 0. The income expansion path has an inverted L-shape when prefer-
ences are quasi-linear (see Figure 2). There is a threshold level of outlay, corresponding
to the kink in the expansion path, such that recipient solely consumes F if outlay is at
or below this level. If outlay is higher than the threshold level, consumption of F is fixed
and all additional outlay is spent on T . Hence, F is a necessary good and T is a luxury
good in a very strong sense.
The economic environment is exactly the same as in Section 2, except that we now
consider a recipient with a planning horizon of N periods, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The recipi-
7In general, the first order conditions are not suﬃcient since the choice sets of early selves need not
be convex. Further restrictions on the problem are needed in order to guarantee suﬃciency. See Laibson
(1997) and Morris (2002), among others, for discussions of this issue.
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ent’s self t has the intertemporal utility function
Ut = Tt + u (Ft) + β
N−tX
i=1
δi [Tt+i + u (Ft+i)] ,
where 0 < β ≤ 1 and 0 < δ < 1 are constants. As before, the parameter δ is the time-
consistent time discount factor, whereas β is an additional discount factor that expresses
self t’s desire for immediate consumption. The recipient receives a transfer bundle of value
B in period 1. The bundle consists of two assets: cash and vouchers for F . The value of
the cash transfer is M and the vouchers have a value of V , such that the recipient faces
two constraints in period one: a money budget constraint,M ≥
PN
i=1 (pFFi + pTTi)−V ,
and a voucher constraint V ≤ pF
PN
i=1 Fi.
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), we distinguish between three types of recip-
ients. Rational recipients, denoted by superscript R, have β = 1, are time-consistent, and
do not suﬀer from the self-control problem. Naïve present-biased recipients, denoted by
superscript P , have β < 1 but are not aware that they will have the self-control problem
in the future. Specifically, a naïve self t believes that all selves t+ 1, . . . , N are rational.
Sophisticated present-biased recipients, whom we denote by superscript S, have β < 1
and are aware that subsequent selves are present-biased as well.
The model is solved in Appendix A.8 The solution has the same structure for all
three types: there exists a type-dependent threshold transfer value B¯ such that the
recipient solely consumes F in all periods if B ≤ B¯. In this case, the distinction between
cash and vouchers does not matter since the entire transfer is spent on F . We say
that the recipient is income constrained. If the transfer value exceeds the threshold, an
inframarginal recipient spends B − B¯ on T in period 1. It is never optimal to consume
T in later periods because utility is linear in T and future utility is discounted.
Consumption of F is spread out over all N periods. The allocation of F is also
8To ensure suﬃciency of the first order conditions for the sophisticated recipient, we assume that the
marginal propensity to consume out of savings is weakly increasing in wealth for all selves. Morris (2002)
describes a fourth-order property of the instantaneous utility function that ensures this in a three-period
model. If u (F ) is of the HARA-class, which nests, e.g., logarithmic and power functions, the marginal
propensity to consume is independent of wealth such that the first order conditions are suﬃcient.
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type-dependent and can be characterized by the Euler equations
uF
¡
FRt
¢
= δuF
¡
FRt+1
¢
,
uF
¡
FPt
¢
= βδuF
¡
FPt+1
¢
,
uF
¡
FSt
¢
=
µ
1− (1− β) pF
∂FSt+1
∂St+1
¶
δuF
¡
FSt+1
¢
.
A rational recipient discounts instantaneous utility in the next period by δ, such that
consumption of F is decreasing over time. The naïve present-biased recipient discounts
instantaneous utility in the next period by βδ, and will therefore choose to save less for
consumption in the subsequent periods than a rational recipient with the same available
income. The consumption of F is also decreasing in time for a naïve recipient. In addition
to the immediate present-bias, a sophisticated recipient also takes account of how savings
aﬀect the self-control problem in the next period. From the viewpoint of a sophisticated
self t, self t+1 does not optimize since the future is discounted too heavily. This implies
that a marginal change in the savings available in period t+ 2 has a first order eﬀect on
self t’s utility. This eﬀect enters the Euler equation through the marginal propensity to
consume in period t+1, pF
¡
∂FSt+1/∂St+1
¢
, which measures the proportion of a marginal
increase in savings, St+1, that is consumed. In a well-behaved equilibrium, where the
marginal propensity to consume is between zero and one, the sophisticated recipient has
decreasing consumption of F over time but puts more relative weight on the next period
than a naïve recipient does.
Rationing aﬀects behavior in an intuitive way when preferences are quasi-linear. A
recipient who is not income constrained will be inframarginal as long as the value of the
vouchers do not exceed the threshold transfer value, that is, when V ≤ B¯. The recipient
is rationed when V > B¯. If V is raised above B¯ and the cash transfer M is reduced,
such that the value of the transfer bundle is kept constant, the amount of cash available
for consumption of T in period 1 is reduced. On the other hand, the additional voucher
income raises consumption of F in all periods. Since the value of the entire transfer
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bundle is held constant, this change will reduce outlay in period 1 and raise outlay in all
subsequent periods.
It is possible to make present-biased recipients better oﬀ, measured by the long-run
utility metric from Section 2.2, through in-kind transfers of the necessary good. In
this case, long-run utility represents the preferences of a recipient with quasi-hyperbolic
preferences who evaluates consumption choices in the N periods before entering period 1.
This welfare measure, obtained by setting β = 1 in the intertemporal utility function of
self 1, captures the fact that the recipient disapproves of any future present-bias and in
case of bias would like to restrain or commit her future behavior. The attractive feature
of asymmetric paternalism also extends to the N-period model. The threshold transfer
value B¯ is larger for a rational recipient than for any type of present-biased recipient.
This makes it possible to choose V such that only present-biased recipients are rationed
and rational recipients are unaﬀected.
Proposition 3. Suppose that no recipients are income constrained. Let B¯R, B¯P , and B¯S
be the threshold transfer values of a rational, a naïve present-biased, and a sophisticated
present-biased recipient, respectively. Then,
(i) B¯R > B¯S and B¯R > B¯P .
(ii) Raising V marginally above B¯S, keeping the transfer value constant, increases the
long-run utility of a sophisticated present-biased recipient.
(iii) Raising V marginally above B¯P , keeping the transfer value constant, increases the
long-run utility of a naïve present-biased recipient.
(iv) There exists a range of values of V that will increase the long-run utility of either a
sophisticated or a naïve present-biased recipient while leaving a rational recipient
inframarginal.
Proof. See appendix B.
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The fact that in-kind transfers can improve long-run utility implies that sophisticated
recipients will prefer to receive future transfers partly in kind. These recipients will readily
agree to be rationed by future transfers in order to limit their self-control problems.
Hence, sophisticated recipients can be helped separately if the government oﬀers two
transfer bundles, diﬀering only in the amount of vouchers, and requires that recipients
choose their preferred bundle before receiving the transfer. The level of V in the bundle
intended for the sophisticated recipients should maximize their long-run utility given the
value of the transfer. Rational and naïve recipients have the same preferences over future
transfers since both types believe they will act rationally. The bundle designated for
these recipients can then be designed to help the naïve present-biased recipients in the
best possible way.9
More generally, the above argument calls for attention to the possibility of provid-
ing benefit recipients with the option of tying (some of) their benefits to consumption
of specific goods. In view of the multitude of in-kind transfer programs and the exist-
ing administrative apparatus, this may be a simple and comparably inexpensive way of
providing these individuals with commitment devices.
4 In-Kind Transfers and Redistribution
So far in the analysis, the only source of heterogeneity has been the degree of the self-
control problem. We focused solely on the eﬃcient design of transfers, cash versus in-kind,
in a world where individuals were simply assumed to be benefit recipients and where the
total value of the transfer B was fixed. The reason for giving out transfers in the first
place, usually justified by diﬀerences in earnings abilities, was not considered. Moreover,
the earnings decision, featuring prominently in the optimal tax-transfer literature, was
9In most cases it will be desirable to separate the naïve and the rational benefit recipients if the
amount of vouchers that maximizes the naïve recipients’ long-run utility exceeds B¯R. This may be
possible if the recipients are to receive several consecutive transfers. Upon receiving a transfer, rationed
naïve recipients are more willing than rational ones to substitute future vouchers for current vouchers.
By allowing the recipients to trade vouchers over time, and by setting appropriate prices for doing so,
the government can make naïve recipients self-select into future transfer bundles with higher levels of V .
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not modeled. These choices were made to focus on the novel aspect of this paper, relating
to the implications of self-control problems for the use of in-kind transfers. However, it is
relevant to consider if the use of in-kind transfers can have adverse (or reinforcing) eﬀects
on self-selection into transfer programs and the possibility for income redistribution.
We extend the N-period model from the previous section with a static labor earnings
choice. For simplicity, we consider an income taxation problem with only two types of
earnings abilities like in, e.g., Stiglitz (1982). The two types of individuals are denoted
H and L and have earnings abilities wH and wL, respectively. We assume that type H
is most able, wH > wL, and that there are the same number of individuals of each type.
Individuals decide on labor earnings, I, which are paid out in period 1 and make up total
earnings over periods 1, . . . , N . Earnings give disutility h (I/w), where h (·) is a strictly
increasing and strictly convex function, such that the able type H has less disutility from
a given level of earnings than type L has. The cash budget constraint in period 1 isPN
i=1 (pFFi + pTTi) = I +B (I), where B (I) is net cash transfers from the government,
integrating both taxes and transfers, as a function of labor earnings.
The timing of the earnings decision is important because our model allows for time-
inconsistent preferences. Since we are ultimately interested in investigating how the
transfers aﬀect the decision on whether to become a benefit recipient or not, it is assumed
that the earnings decision is made before the transfers are given out (i.e., before period
1). Hence, we should think of an individual who decides on a level of labor earnings (e.g.,
an occupation) before the beginning of the transfer month. The individual receives labor
earnings and net transfers on the first day of the month and then allocates consumption
over the month through a series of consecutive optimization problems. This framework
allows us to focus on the eﬀect of in-kind transfers while disregarding the possibility of
present-bias in the allocation of work eﬀort.10
10Obviously, present-biased preferences may be very important for decisions on when to provide eﬀort,
see for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The assumption should rather be viewed as resulting
from features of the transfer program: the certification decision on eligibility for transfer benefits is made
before the recipient receives the transfer bundle.
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Earnings are chosen to maximize long-run utility of consumption less the disutility of
earnings
ψj (I +B (I) , V )− h
µ
I
w
¶
,
where ψj (I +B (I) , V ) is the indirect long-run utility function, conditional on cash in-
come, I + B (I), and voucher income, V . We need to distinguish between two diﬀerent
indirect utility functions (hence the index), since the evaluation of long-run utility de-
pends on whether the individual accounts for the present-bias or not. Rational and naïve
present-biased individuals have the same indirect utility function, since both types be-
lieve that they will act rationally in the future. In contrast, sophisticated individuals
know that they will be present-biased and evaluate utility accordingly. This distinction
becomes crucial when introducing in-kind transfers.
Suppose the government wishes to redistribute income from the able type H to the
less able L. The government cannot observe abilities and instead implements a pure
income tax. For simplicity, we assume that all type H individuals are identical with
respect to the self-control problem. When there are only two ability types, it can be
shown that the optimal income tax consists of a cut-oﬀ income level I¯ and a transfer
value τ . Individuals with income I¯ or less receive a cash transfer, such that B (I) = τ for
I ≤ I¯, while individuals with higher income pays τ in taxes, B (I) = −τ for I > I¯. The
income taxation problem is constrained by a self-selection constraint: it must be optimal
for the able type to pay the tax. Hence, the utility of H from having high earnings and
paying the tax must exceed the utility from masquerading as type L by earning I¯ and
receiving the transfer. A masquerading type H will choose exactly the same consumption
path as the true type L, since the disutility of earnings is additively separable, such that
the self-selection constraint for type H under the pure income tax is
ψj (IH − τ , 0)− h
µ
IH
wH
¶
≥ ψj
¡
I¯ + τ , 0
¢
− h
µ
I¯
wH
¶
. (5)
When the government is constrained to cash transfers, (5) must hold with equality in the
optimum. It is assumed that the optimal tax system fulfills I¯ + τ ≥ B¯R, such that no
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recipients are income constrained.
Now suppose that the government replaces part of the cash transfer with vouchers
for F . There are two cases: (a) If type H individuals are rational or naïve, present-
biased transfer recipients can be helped without aﬀecting the self-selection constraint.
The argument follows from noticing that (5) is unchanged for rational and naïve type
H individuals when V ≤ B¯R. Since it in fact is possible to ration both sophisticated
and naïve recipients for some V < B¯R, vouchers can target recipients who have the
self-control problem without aﬀecting the choices of anyone else. (b) If individuals of
type H are sophisticated present-biased it is possible that the self-selection constraint
tightens. Since vouchers oﬀer a possibility of self-control, sophisticated individuals may
find the transfer bundle more attractive if V exceeds their threshold value. In this case,
the value of the transfer will have to decrease in order to fulfill the constraint, which
surely makes rational recipients worse oﬀ. Hence, the government may face a trade-oﬀ.
Since we cannot a priori say whether naïve or sophisticated present-biased recipients have
the largest threshold value, it may be possible to help naïve recipients without aﬀecting
the transfer size.
The model is very simple but it highlights a potential concern: government measures
to correct self-control problems through the design of taxes and transfers may aﬀect self-
selection into benefit programs.11 The implications for the deadweight loss of taxation
and the costs of income redistribution should be taken into account when comparing the
pros and cons of such paternalistic policies.
11The idea that transfers in kind can be used to target benefits has a long history in the literature.
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) demonstrate how in-kind transfers of certain indicator goods, where
consumption is negatively correlated with ability (such as medicine), may facilitate redistribution. By
including indicator goods in the transfer bundle, able types will find the transfer bundle less attractive
such that the self-selection constraint is eased (the model in this paper precludes this possibility because
disutility of earnings is separable in the utility function). The argument in this paper is in many ways the
exact opposite. If recipients are present-biased, it is desirable in itself to restrict the recipients’ choices.
Further, transfers should be tied to a good that the intended target group is less likely to consume for
a given level of income. Finally, as this section shows, the transfers may aﬀect self-selection adversely if
individuals are aware that they will have a self-control problem in the future.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has considered the eﬃcient design of transfers in the presence of self-control
problems. Intertemporal distortions in consumption arising from present-biased prefer-
ences also distort the consumption bundle toward luxury goods. Transfers that are partly
tied to a necessary good can help recipients with present-biased preferences to curb their
self-control problems while at the same time leave fully rational recipients unaﬀected. In
consequence, the analysis has provided a behavioral foundation for the concept of merit
goods. To the extent that in-kind transfers help to reduce self-control problems, such
transfers may be more eﬃcient than analysis within the rational choice framework would
suggest.
A number of details that have been left out above are worth discussing. First, the
analysis only considered the case with two goods. It is possible to extend the argument
to cases with more goods, where there may be several necessary goods. In these cases it
is not suﬃcient to provide vouchers for any necessary good; it has to be the necessary
good that is least responsive with respect to outlay. Except in knife-edge cases, including
the case with a linear income expansion path, in-kind transfers can force recipients to
smooth consumption.
Second, the analysis presumed that there was no interest rate. The benefits from tying
transfers to vouchers come at a cost if cash savings accrue interest but vouchers do not.
In this case, voucher income may in itself distort consumption toward the present such
that the beneficial eﬀects are lessened. This is arguably a minor cost, however, bearing in
mind the empirical indication of a high percentage of recipients without savings accounts
or interest income.
Third, we assumed that vouchers could not be exchanged for money. Obviously, the
restrictions that tied transfers place on recipients may result in the creation of a black
market for vouchers. If vouchers can be costlessly converted into cash, rationing has no
eﬀect on consumption. However, traders in the black market face search costs and risks
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of detection which tend to lower the resale price and reduce the attractiveness of voucher
traﬃcking. Whitmore (2002) uses survey evidence to investigate the black market for
U.S. food stamps and finds that food stamps are, on average, traded at 64 percent of
their nominal value. In addition, the government may take appropriate action in order to
reduce the possibilities for voucher trade. As an example, Whitmore (op.cit.) argues that
the implementation of the Electronic Benefit Transfer system, where food stamp benefits
are distributed with a debit card instead of actual stamps, has reduced large-scale black
market trading by food merchants, since transactions can be monitored easily.
One final issue that we touched upon in Section 4, but which deserves further scrutiny,
is the take up of benefits. The incentive to work is only one aspect of the take up decision.
In reality, not all individuals or households eligible for benefits choose to enroll in the
benefit programs. Possible explanations include social “stigma,” hassles and transaction
costs, as well as informational constraints, all of which may be aﬀected by the design of
transfers. Behavioral factors constitute an additional explanation for low take up rates
in welfare programs (see Currie, 2004) and oﬀer an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A The N-Period Model
A.1 Self N
In order to characterize the recipient’s behavior, we proceed sequentially and start with
the utility maximization problem of the last self, self N . Let SMN and S
V
N denote the
savings in cash and vouchers, respectively, of self N − 1. The recipient maximizes UN =
TN + u (FN) with respect to FN and TN subject to three constraints: the cash budget
constraint SMN ≥ pTTN + pFFN − SVN , the voucher constraint SVN ≤ pFFN and a non-
negativity constraint on T , TN ≥ 0. The first order conditions for self N ’s optimum
are
uF (FN) = (λ− γ) pF ,
1 + µTN = λpT ,
where λ, γ, and µTN are the Lagrange multipliers of the cash budget constraint, the
voucher constraint, and the non-negativity constraint, respectively. Define Fˆ by uF
³
Fˆ
´
=
pF/pT . There are three possible types of solutions: i) if SMN + S
V
N < pF Fˆ , the recipi-
ent is income constrained and spends all income on FN . ii) If SMN + S
V
N ≥ pF Fˆ and
SVN ≤ pF Fˆ , the recipient chooses FN = Fˆ and spends all residual cash savings on T ,
pTTN = SMN − pF Fˆ . iii) If SVN > pF Fˆ , the recipient is rationed and chooses SVN = pFFN .
Any cash savings are spent on TN , such that pTTN = SMN .
The intuition behind this is quite simple. If the level of savings is very low, the
recipient solely consumes the necessary good F (case i). If savings are higher the recipient
would like to choose FN = Fˆ and spend residual savings on the luxury good T . This is
only possible if voucher savings are suﬃciently low (case ii). Otherwise, the recipient is
constrained to spend voucher savings on F (case iii), such that consumption of F exceeds
Fˆ . The important lesson learned from this exercise is that self N only consumes T if
savings are suﬃciently high and cash savings are available.
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A.2 Sophisticated Selves
Self t receives cash savings SMt and voucher savings S
V
t . The savings available for self
t+ 1 can be found by subtracting period t consumption: SMt+1 = S
M
t − pTTt and SVt+1 =
SVt − pFFt. A sophisticated self t, t ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} is aware of the time-inconsistency
problem and knows that subsequent selves are present-biased. Consequently, self t knows
how savings SMt+1 and S
V
t+1 influence the decisions of future selves. We assume that a
Markov perfect equilibrium with diﬀerentiable strategies for F exists. Hence, we can
think of the choices of selves t+1, . . . N as functions of SMt+1 and S
V
t+1. We further assume
that the marginal propensity to consume F (abbr. MPC) is weakly increasing in wealth
for each self. As mentioned in Section 3, Morris (2002) derives a property that ensures
this in a three period model. If u (F ) is HARA, e.g., a logarithmic or power function,
the MPC is independent of wealth.
We characterize the equilibrium strategy by going through the following four steps:
1. We first assume that selves k, . . . , N solely consume F . We find the first order
conditions for these selves under this restriction.
2. We then solve the maximization problem for self t under the restriction that selves
t+ 1, . . . , N solely consume F . This allows us to find conditions for Tt > 0.
3. Then we turn to self t − 1. Self t − 1 prefers that Tt = 0 such that savings fulfill
the conditions we found under pt. 2. Self t − 1’s problem is then similar to the
problem we have just solved for self t. We check whether the solution is consistent
with Tt = 0.
4. Finally, we find the equilibrium strategy using backward induction.
1. Suppose that selves k, . . . , N do not consume T . The behavior of these selves only
depends on total savings Sk = SMk + S
F
k , since F can be purchased using either cash
or vouchers. Self k maximizes Uk = u (Fk) + β
PN−k
i=1 δ
iu (Fk+i) with respect to Fk and
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subject to the cash budget constraint. In the optimum, the cash budget constraint will
be fulfilled with equality since u (F ) is increasing. This allows us to substitute for FN by
using the budget constraint. The first order condition for Fk is
βδN−ku (FN) = uF (Fk)− β
£
δuF (Fk+1)− δN−ku (FN)
¤
pF
∂Fk+1
∂Sk+1
(6)
−β
N−k−1X
i=2
£
δiuF (Fk+i)− δN−ku (FN)
¤
pF
∂Fk+i
∂Sk+i
∂Sk+i
∂Sk+1
.
We can obtain the first order condition for Fk+1 in a similar manner. Multiplying this
by δ (∂Sk+2/∂Sk+1) = δ [1− pF (∂Fk+1/∂Sk+1)] and subtracting it from (6) gives
uF (Fk) =
µ
1− (1− β) pF
∂Fk+1
∂Sk+1
¶
δuF (Fk+1) , (7)
which is the Euler equation. The marginal utility of Fk+1 is discounted by the exponential
time discount factor δ and a term correcting for the eﬀect on Fk+1 from amarginal increase
in savings. If self k + 1’s MPC, pF (∂Fk+1/∂Sk+1), is positive, then a lower value of β
implies that self k discounts future consumption more heavily.
We can make four observations: (a) if the MPC of self k + 1 is positive and weakly
increasing in wealth, pF
£
∂2Fk+1/ (∂Sk+1)
2¤ ≥ 0, then the MPC of self k is strictly between
zero and one and the first order condition for Fk is suﬃcient. (b) The MPC of all selves
k, . . . , N − 1 are strictly between zero and one if they are weakly increasing in wealth.
(c) Aggregate consumption of F ,
PN−k
i=0 Fk+i, is increasing in Sk if the MPC of selves
k, . . . , N − 1 are weakly increasing in wealth. (d) If the MPC of all selves are strictly
between zero and one, Fk+i is decreasing in i (decreasing consumption path).
2. Under the restriction that selves t + 1, . . . , N solely consume F , self t maximizes
Tt + u (Ft) + β
PN−t
i=1 δ
iu (Ft+i) with respect to Ft and Tt subject to the constraints
SMt ≥ pTTt +
N−tX
i=0
pFFt+i − SVt ,
SVt ≤ pF
N−tX
i=0
Ft+i,
Tt ≥ 0.
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Since the cash budget constraint will be fulfilled with equality in the optimum, we can
rewrite the voucher constraint as SMt ≥ Tt. The behavior of subsequent selves only
depends on total savings St+1, such that there is just one state variable in self t’s maxi-
mization problem. We can use (6) with k = t to characterize the first order condition for
Ft, and (7) to characterize the Euler equation. Let γ and µTt be the Lagrange multipliers
of the voucher constraint and the non-negativity constraint, respectively. The first order
condition for Tt is
uF (Ft) =
¡
1 + µTt
¢ pF
pT
− γpF , (8)
where we have used the first order condition for Ft.
The solution to self t’s problem is characterized by (7) for k = t, . . . , N − 1, (8), and
the constraints. Our assumption that the MPC is weakly increasing in wealth ensures
that the first order conditions are suﬃcient. First, assume that Tt > 0 and that the
voucher constraint is not binding. From (8) we see that uF (Ft) = pF/pT , such that
Ft = Fˆ . In this case, the Euler equations for selves t + 1, . . . , N − 1 and the budget
constraints describe a unique solution for Ft+1, . . . , FN , which we denote
¡
F ∗t+1, . . . , F
∗
N
¢
.
Define S¯t = pF
³
Fˆ +
PN−t
i=1 F
∗
t+i
´
. This is the threshold level of savings for self t. As in
Section A.1, there are three possible types of solutions:
i) If SMt +S
V
t < S¯t, self t is income constrained and chooses Tt = 0. To see this, suppose
that Tt > 0. From (8) we get that Ft ≥ Fˆ . It then follows from the Euler equation and
properties (a)—(c) from above that pF
³
Ft +
PN−t
i=1 Ft+i
´
≥ S¯t, which violates the budget
constraint.
ii) If SMt + S
V
t ≥ S¯t and SVt ≤ S¯t, self t chooses Ft = Fˆ and
¡
F ∗t+1, . . . , F
∗
N
¢
. All
residual cash savings are spent on Tt. To see this, suppose that Ft < Fˆ . This requires
that µTt > 0 such that Tt = 0. Using the Euler equation and the properties mentioned
above, we find that pF
³
Ft +
PN−t
i=1 Ft+i
´
< S¯t, which would imply that not all savings
are spent. This is not possible. On the contrary, suppose that Ft > Fˆ . This would
require that γ > 0 such that the voucher constraint is binding, SVt = pF
PN−t
i=0 Ft+i.
Since Ft > Fˆ we must have SVt > S¯t, which was ruled out by assumption.
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iii) If SVt > S¯t self t is rationed and spends all voucher savings on F . Any cash
savings are spent on Tt. To see this, note that we get pF
PN−t
i=0 Ft+i > S¯t from the
voucher constraint. This implies that Ft > Fˆ , which in turn requires γ > 0, such that the
voucher constraint is binding. From the cash budget constraint we then find SMt = pTTt.
3. The intertemporal utility of self t− 1 is Tt−1+ u (Ft−1) + βδ
³
Tt +
PN−t
i=0 δ
iu (Ft+i)
´
.
Self t− 1 never wants Tt > 0, as long as βδ < 1, since any income spent on Tt would be
better spent on Tt−1. Hence, the savings of self t−1 must satisfy either SMt +SVt ≤ S¯t or
SVt > S¯t and S
M
t = 0. That is, self t must either be income constrained or savings must
be entirely in vouchers. When Tt = 0 the maximization problem of self t − 1 is similar
to the problem we solved above. All we need to do now is to check that this solution is
indeed consistent with Tt = 0.
If SMt−1 + S
V
t−1 < S¯t−1 (case i) or S
M
t−1 + S
V
t−1 ≥ S¯t−1 and SVt−1 ≤ S¯t−1 (case ii), we
know that Ft−1 ≤ Fˆ . Hence, from the Euler equation, savings fulfill SMt +SVt ≤ S¯t−1− Fˆ .
When the MPC of self t is between zero and one we have S¯t−1 − Fˆ < S¯t. Hence, self t is
income constrained and chooses Tt = 0. If SVt−1 > S¯t−1 (case iii) we know that any cash
savings are spent on Tt−1. Hence, self t must choose Tt = 0.
4. Self N − 1 wants TN = 0 and chooses SMN + SVN < pF Fˆ or SMN = 0. We can describe
the solution to self N − 1’s problem by (7), (8), and the constraints. The equilibrium
strategy follows from backward induction.
The threshold transfer value is B¯S = pF
³
Fˆ +
PN−1
i=1 F
∗
1+i
´
, where F ∗2 , . . . , F
∗
N solve
uF
¡
F ∗1+i
¢
=
pF/pTQi
j=1
³
1− (1− β) pF
∂F∗1+j
∂S1+j
´
δi
, i = 1, . . . , N − 2,
uF
¡
F ∗N−1
¢
= βδuF (F ∗N) ,
S2+i = S1+i − pFF ∗1+i, i = 1, . . . , N − 2, (9)
S2 = pF
N−1X
i=1
F ∗1+i.
This value determines whether a sophisticated recipient is income constrained or rationed.
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The recipient is income constrained if B ≤ B¯S. An inframarginal recipient (B > B¯S and
V ≤ B¯S) chooses T1 = B − B¯S and
³
Fˆ , F ∗2 , . . . , N
´
. A rationed recipient (B > B¯S
and V > B¯S) chooses T1 =M and an allocation of (F1, F2, . . . , N) that fulfills the Euler
equations, given by (7), and the voucher constraint.
A.3 Rational Selves
A rational recipient does not have present-biased preferences, which is captured by β = 1.
A rational self t maximizes Ut = Tt + u (Ft) +
PN−t
i=1 δ
i [Tt+i + u (Ft+i)] with respect to
{Ft+j}N−tj=0 and {Tt+j}N−tj=0 , subject to the constraints
SMt ≥
N−tX
i=0
(pTTt+i + pFFt+i)− SVt ,
SVt ≤ pF
N−tX
i=0
Ft+i,
Tt+j ≥ 0, j = 0, . . . , N − t.
The first order conditions for (Ft+j, Tt+j) are
δjuF (Fj) = (λ− γ) pF ,
δj = λpT − µTt+j ,
where λ and γ are the Lagrange multipliers of the cash budget constraint and the voucher
constraint, respectively, and µTt+j is the multiplier of the non-negativity constraint on
Tt+j. From the first order conditions we can obtain the Euler equation for Ft
uF (Ft) = δuF (Ft+1) ,
and an expression for the intratemporal allocation in period t
uF (Ft) =
¡
1 + µTt
¢ pF
pT
− γpF .
Because future utility is discounted, δ < 1, we have Tt+1, . . . , TN = 0 and a decreasing
consumption path for F .
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The threshold transfer value of a rational recipient is B¯R = pF
³
Fˆ +
PN−1
i=1 F
∗
1+i
´
,
where F ∗2 , . . . , F
∗
N solve
uF
¡
F ∗1+i
¢
=
pF/pT
δi
, i = 1, . . . , N − 1. (10)
A.4 Naïve Selves
The naïve present-biased self t has β < 1 but believes that subsequent selves behave
rationally. The maximization problem is similar to the problem of a rational self, except
that intertemporal utility is Tt+u (Ft)+β
PN−t
i=1 δ
i [Tt+i + u (Ft+i)]. Similar to the analysis
in the previous section, we can find the Euler condition
uF (Ft) = βδuF (Ft+1) ,
and an expression for Tt
uF (Ft) =
¡
1 + µTt
¢ pF
pT
− γpF ,
from the first order conditions. It follows from the Euler condition and the properties
of u (F ) that the MPC of each self is strictly between zero and one. Self t is rationed if
SVt > S¯t ≡ Fˆ +
PN−t
i=1 F˜t+i, where F˜t+1, . . . , F˜N solve
pF
pT
= βδiuF (Ft+i) , i = 1, . . . , N − t.
A naïve self t does not wish subsequent selves to consume T because βδ < 1. This
implies that self t will tie all savings to vouchers or make sure that future selves are
income constrained. However, since the naïve self t misperceives her future behavior, we
need to check whether self t+ 1 indeed will be constrained by the savings of self t.
All savings will be in vouchers if self t is rationed which implies that subsequent selves
cannot consume T . If self t is not rationed, savings St+1 will never exceed S¯t − Fˆ . Self
t+ 1 is income constrained if St+1 ≤ S¯t+1 = Fˆ +
PN−t−1
i=1 F˜t+i. If we subtract S¯t+1 from
S¯t − Fˆ we get
S¯t − Fˆ − S¯t+1 = F˜N − Fˆ < 0,
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such that we always have St+1 < S¯t+1. Hence, self t+ 1 will be income constrained.
The threshold transfer value for a naïve recipient is B¯P = pF
³
Fˆ +
PN−1
i=1 F
∗
1+i
´
,
where F ∗2 , . . . , F
∗
N solve
uF
¡
F ∗1+i
¢
=
pF/pT
βδi
, i = 1, . . . , N − 1. (11)
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimum is characterized by four equations in four unknowns
when the voucher constraint is binding. If we linearize these equations we get the following
system of equations
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
uTT (T1, F1) uTF (T1, F1) −βδuTT (T2, F2) −βδuTF (T2, F2)
uTF (T1, F1) uFF (T1, F1) −βδuTF (T2, F2) −βδuFF (T2, F2)
pT 0 pT 0
0 pF 0 pF
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
dT1
dF1
dT2
dF2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
0
dM
dV
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Our main concern is the change in outlay in period one if V increases and M decreases
such that the sum B =M+V is constant. Under the restriction that dM = −dV , period
one outlay changes by dB1 = [pF (∂F1/∂V − ∂F1/∂M) + pT (∂T1/∂V − ∂T1/∂M)] dV .
This is negative if and only if pF (∂F1/∂V − ∂F1/∂M) < pT (∂T1/∂V − ∂T1/∂M). The
voucher constraint is still binding after the change. The concavity of u (F, T ) ensures
that the Jacobian has a non-negative determinant. We assume that the recipient is in a
regular optimum where the determinant of the Jacobian is diﬀerent from zero, such that
we can use the implicit function theorem to solve for ∂T1/∂V and ∂F1/∂V . After some
algebra we find that dB1 < 0 if and only if
[pTuFF (F1, T1)− pFuTF (F1, T1)] [pFuTT (F2, T2)− pTuTF (F2, T2)]
> [pTuFF (F2, T2)− pFuTF (F2, T2)] [pFuTT (F1, T1)− pTuTF (F1, T1)] .
All parentheses are negative if both F and T are normal goods. This allows us to rewrite
the condition to (4). ¤
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Proof of Proposition 1. Diﬀerentiation of the long-run utility function yields
dU =
µ
1
β
− 1
¶ ∙
pF
µ
∂F1
∂M
− ∂F1
∂V
¶
+ pT
µ
∂T1
∂M
− ∂T1
∂V
¶¸
uF
¡
FP1 , T
P
1
¢
pF
dV,
where we have used the first order conditions. The first term is only positive if β < 1.
The expression in the square brackets is the change in period 1 outlay, dB1, frommarginal
rationing in the inframarginal optimum. From Lemma 1 and the derivation of the slope of
the income expansion path we know that dB1 < 0 if and only if dTP1 /dF
P
1 > dT
P
2 /dF
P
2 . ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. The recipients face identical budget constraints because they
receive identical transfers. Their consumption bundles fulfill
pT
£
TR1 + T
R
2 −
¡
TP1 + T
P
2
¢¤
+ pF
£
FR1 + F
R
2 −
¡
FP1 + F
P
2
¢¤
= 0,
where
¡
TR1 , T
R
2
¢
and
¡
TP1 , T
P
2
¢
are the inframarginal demands for T of the rational and the
present-biased recipient, respectively. We know that a present-biased recipient chooses a
larger outlay in period one than a rational recipient since u (T, F ) is strictly concave. The
assumption that both T and F are normal goods then implies that FP2 < F
R
2 < F
R
1 < F
P
1
and TP2 < T
R
2 < T
R
1 < T
P
1 . There exists constants α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that we can
write FR1 and F
R
2 as convex combinations of F
P
1 and F
P
2 ; F
R
1 = αF
P
1 + (1− α)FP2 and
FR2 = βF
P
1 + (1− β)FP2 .
Suppose that FP1 +F
P
2 > F
R
1 +F
R
2 . Then F
P
1 +F
P
2 > (α+ β)F
P
1 + [2− (α+ β)]FP2 ,
such that α+ β < 1 because FP1 > F
P
2 . The income expansion path can be expressed as
a strictly increasing function T = f (F ), such that there is a unique corresponding value
of T to any F . It follows from Jensen’s inequality that if f (F ) is convex on
£
FP2 , F
P
1
¤
then
f
¡
FR1
¢
= f
¡
αFP1 + (1− α)FP2
¢
≤ αf
¡
FP1
¢
+ (1− α) f
¡
FP2
¢
,
f
¡
FR2
¢
= f
¡
βFP1 + (1− β)FP2
¢
≤ βf
¡
FP1
¢
+ (1− β) f
¡
FP2
¢
.
This implies that
f
¡
FR1
¢
+ f
¡
FR2
¢
≤ (α+ β) f
¡
FP1
¢
+ [2− (α+ β)] f
¡
FP2
¢
< f
¡
FP1
¢
+ f
¡
FP2
¢
,
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because α + β < 1 and f (F ) is a strictly increasing function. This violates the budget
constraint. Thus, we must have FR1 + F
R
2 ≥ FP1 + FP2 . The proof is analogous if the
income expansion path is strictly convex. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The result follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i)Threshold transfer values The threshold transfer value for fully rational recipients,
B¯R, is given by (10). It is fairly easy to see that B¯S, which is defined by (9), is smaller
than B¯R when the MPC of the sophisticated recipient is between zero and one. The
assumption of weakly increasing MPC ensures this. Similarly, B¯P , defined by (11), is
smaller than B¯R.
(ii) Sophisticated recipients The long-run utility welfare measure is
U = T1 + u (F1) +
N−1X
i=1
δiu (F1+i) . (12)
When B > B¯R we have B > B¯S, such that the recipient is not income constrained.
The sophisticated recipient chooses the inframarginal optimum if V = B¯S. The eﬀect on
welfare from raising V by dV > 0, and lowering the cash transfer by a similar amount, is
dU =
Ã
uF (F1)
∂F1
∂V
+
N−1X
i=1
δiuF (F1+i)
∂F1+i
∂S1+i
∂S1+i
∂S2
µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
− 1
pT
!
dV,
where we have used that the recipient becomes rationed, such that all cash income is
spent on T1. Diﬀerentiate the voucher constraint in order to substitute for ∂FN/∂S2 and
rearrange to get
dU
dV
=
⎛
⎜⎝
£
δuF (F2)− δN−1uF (FN)
¤
pF ∂F2∂S2
+
PN−2
i=2
£
δiuF (F1+i)− δN−1uF (FN)
¤
pF
∂F1+i
∂S1+i
∂S1+i
∂S2
+δN−1uF (FN)
⎞
⎟⎠
¡
1− pF ∂F1∂V
¢
pF
+uF (F1)
∂F1
∂V
− 1
pT
.
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The expression in the large parenthesis equals (1/β)uF (F1), which can be seen by using
(6). Inserting this yields
dU
dV
=
uF (F1)
pF
1
β
∙
1− (1− β) pF
∂F1
∂V
¸
− 1
pT
.
Since the recipient is only marginally rationed we know that uF (F1) =
pF
pT
, which we use
to obtain the final expression for dU
dU =
µ
1
β
− 1
¶µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
dV
pT
.
This is positive when β < 1 and the MPC in period 1 is between zero and one. The latter
condition is fulfilled when the MPC is weakly increasing in wealth.
(iii) Naïve recipients Recall that the long-run utility measure is given by (12). When
B > B¯R we have B > B¯P , such that the recipient is not income constrained. The
eﬀect on long run utility from raising V marginally above B¯P , keeping the transfer value
constant, is
dU =
Ã
pF
pT
∂F1
∂V
+
N−1X
i=1
δiuF (F1+i)
∂F1+i
∂S1+i
∂S1+i
∂S2
µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
− 1
pT
!
dV,
where we have used that uF (F1) = pF/pT . Because all naïve selves 1, . . . , N − 2 are
“cheated” by subsequent selves, there is no straightforward way to compare the marginal
utilities across selves by using the first order conditions. However, it is possible to find
a suﬃcient condition for a welfare improvement by using that self N − 1 predicts the
marginal utility of self N correctly: we know that uF (FN−1) = βδuF (FN). A suﬃcient
condition for dU/dV > 0 is
pF
pT
∂F1
∂V
+
N−2X
i=1
δiuF (F1+i)
∂F1+i
∂S1+i
∂S1+i
∂S2
µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
(13)
+δN−2uF (FN−1)
1
β
∂FN
∂SN
∂SN
∂S2
µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
>
1
pT
.
Next, observe that each naïve self 1 + i, where i = 1, . . . , N − 2, plans to have
FN < F ∗N . This follows from the fact that self 2 saves less than
PN−1
i=2 F
∗
1+i and that the
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MPC is between zero and one. The first order conditions for self 1 + i then imply that
uF (F1+i) > βδ
N−1−iuF (F ∗N). Multiply this by δ
i to find
δiuF (F1+i) > βδ
N−1uF (F ∗N) =
pF
pT
.
This means that we can substitute pF/pT for δiuF (F1+i) in (13), since the MPC is between
zero and one, such that the condition reduces toµ
1
β
− 1
¶
pF
∂FN
∂SN
∂SN
∂S2
µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
>
Ã
1−
N−1X
i=1
pF
∂F1+i
∂S1+i
∂S1+i
∂S2
!µ
1− pF
∂F1
∂V
¶
.
The right hand side is equal to zero, which can be seen by diﬀerentiating the voucher con-
straint. By using that ∂FN/∂SN = 1/pF and ∂SN/∂S2 =
QN−2
j=1 [1− pF (∂F1+j/∂S1+j)] ∈
(0, 1), the condition reduces to (1/β − 1) [1− pF (∂F1/∂V )] > 0, which is fulfilled since
β < 1 and the MPC of a naïve self 1 is between zero and one.
(iv) Asymmetric Paternalism Follows from (i)—(iii). ¤
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